The Mode of Mental Existence of Philosophical Concepts: A Comparative Study of Mullā Ṣadrā and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī

Mullā Ṣadrā and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī restrict mental existence to essences; Two considerations compel them to analyze the mode of mental existence of philosophical concepts: (1) the otherness (ʿurūḍ) and description (ittiṣāf) of such concepts in the external world; (2) the essential representational character of concepts, which requires that every concept- whether substantive or philosophical- must have an actualized or non-actualized referent. For Mullā Ṣadrā, philosophical concepts resemble abstract mental notions. They signify external realities and are abstracted directly from the essences of those realities; their accidental function is thus intrinsic. In contrast, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī regards philosophical concepts as conventional notions, abstracted not from external essences but from mental concepts themselves. According to him, judgment (ḥukm) belongs to the genus of creation (ījād), and this positing arises from a necessity discerned by reason. By compulsion, the intellect establishes a posited referent for these concepts. This study employs an analytical-critical method to compare the two positions. Mullā Ṣadrā considers the truth (ṣidq) of philosophical concepts with respect to their instances as essential, whereas ʿAllāma views it as accidental (bi’l-ʿaraḍ). If justification exists for such truth, why should that not itself serve as the source of abstraction? ʿAllāma’s analysis proves inconsistent with the primacy and self-evidence of the concept of existence, and the notion of compulsion and positing by the intellect is untenable. For both thinkers, the defining feature of acquired knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī) is its disclosive character (kashfiyyat), which extends to philosophical concepts. It follows that in philosophical concepts, acquired knowledge is non-comprehensive (ghayr iktināhī), whereas in quiddative concepts it is comprehensive (iktināhī). Mullā Ṣadrā’s view aligns more closely with this analysis. The extension of mental existence to philosophical concepts is significant in theology and can also clarify the realization of concepts in political, social, and cultural spheres.