Document Type : Scientific Research

Author

• Mohammad Hosseinzadeh

Abstract

Mulla Sadrā's view about the ideality of quiddity is interpreted in various, even contradicting, forms. Allamah Tabatabaii’s and Ayatollah Fayazi's views on explaining the ideality of quiddity are among the most important interpretations of Mulla Sadra’s theory. Allamah Tabatabaii has rejected any external existence of quiddity and has considered it as a mental mirage of reality; whereas Ayatollah Fayazi believes that the ideal quiddity exists externally as well. Ayatollah fayazi holds the belief that attribution of existence to the existing quiddity is an “actual attribution“. However, it seems to me that none of the above-mentioned interpretations have explained Mulla Sadrā's theory correctly. What can be inferred from Mulla Sadra’s works is that quiddity is not externally non-existent and possesses a kind of existence. It is, however, different from the existence of quiddity. For specific reasons, he argues that the term “existent” cannot be used for the existence of quiddity, and has considered this kind of existence as affirmation of thingness. In this paper, Allamah Tabatabaii and Ayatollah Fayazi's interpretations of Mulla Sadra’s view as well as mine are discussed at first, and then some of the consequences of such a debate for Mulla Sadra’s philosophy are presented.

Keywords

• quiddity
• Contracted Existence
• Differentiated Existence
• Undifferentiated Existence
• Affirmative Thingness
• Existential Thingness
• Mulla Sadra

Main Subjects

• falsafe molasadra